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ABSTRACT
ILLUSORY JUDGMENTS UNDER CONDITIONS OF UNCERTAINTY:
REASONING ERRORS RELATED TO
PARANORMAL AND RELIGIOUS BELIEFS
by Erin C. Goforth
University of New Hampshire, May 2008
This research examined the predictors of illusory judgments of prediction
under conditions of uncertainty. Study 1 investigated the believability of an
experimental manipulation that required participants to choose a strategy for
target object selection. Study 2 expanded upon Study 1 by giving participants an
additional choice strategy (e.g., a computer's selection). In both Study 1 and
Study 2, participants relied on the paranormal strategy (e.g., a psychic) to a
greater degree under conditions of uncertainty than under conditions of certainty.
Study 3 replicated these results using a between subjects design but also
expanded upon Study 1 and 2 by examining individual difference and
demographic predictors of paranormal strategy selection under conditions of
uncertainty. Paranormal involvement and religious involvement were also
analyzed. In Study 3, participants who chose the psychic more often were also
more likely to overestimate the probability of correctly locating a hidden object.
These results are discussed in terms of illusory prediction. Personal paranormal
involvement and religious involvement were associated with less reliance on the
psychic strategy, whereas general paranormal involvement was associated with

X

greater reliance on the psychic strategy. Implications for this research include a
possible increased predilection for gambling based upon personal paranormal
beliefs. Further, this research indicates that individuals with high paranormal
beliefs may be vulnerable toward psychic services during times of uncertainty.
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INTRODUCTION
The great philosophers in sociology, Marx, Durkheim, and Weber,
theorized that as societies became modernized they would become more
complex and rational. As a result of this "modernization", non-scientific beliefs
such as religion and belief in the paranormal would eventually disappear (see
Berger, 2008 for a discussion). Contrary to secularization theory, even educated
people in the 21 st century still hold non-scientific beliefs. In the United States, an
estimated 50% of Americans believe in extrasensory perception (as cited in
Wiseman & Watt, 2006) and more than 90% of Americans believe in at least one
paranormal phenomenon (Gallup, 1997). In the religious realm of beliefs, nearly
44% of Americans would classify themselves as frequent church attendees
(Gallup, 2007) and 77% believe in Heaven, 63% believe in Hell, and 58% believe
in the Devil (General Social Survey, 2004).
An extensive line of paranormal and religious research has been
conducted investigating the differences between believers and non-believers
including differences in cognitive ability (Gray & Mill, 1990; Irwin, 1993; Musch &
Ehrenberg, 2002), reasoning (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove, French,
& Jones, 2006; Brugger, Landis, & Regard, 1990; Dagnall, Parker, & Munley,
2007; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Wierzbicki, 1985)), and individual differences
(Allen & Lester, 1994; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Singer &
Benassi, 1981; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Under the broad framework of illusory
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judgment, many researchers have looked at paranormal and religious beliefs
from an illusion of control viewpoint (Brugger et al., 1990; Irwin, 1993; Rudski,
2004); however, the focus of this research is to examine paranormal and
religious beliefs from an illusion of prediction viewpoint (see Presson & Benassi,
1996). The relation between illusion of prediction and paranormal/religious beliefs
was explored in this research using an online experimental paradigm. The
investigation begins with a study that explores participants' reliance on a psychic
in a subjective probability card-guessing task. The second study explores
whether participants will take advantage of a third choice under conditions of
uncertainty in prediction. The focus of the research broadens in the third study,
which examines the individual differences that may predict why some participants
rely on the selections of a psychic when trying to predict the correct target.
The primary goal of this research was to evaluate the predictors of psychic
selection under conditions of uncertainty based upon subjective probabilities of
success. It was hypothesized that individuals who held more "self
paranormal/religious beliefs such as believing that they actually had paranormal
ability, or those who were behaviorally involved in their beliefs (i.e., performing
psychic services or regularly attending church), would rely less on the psychic
under conditions of uncertainty. A secondary goal of this research was to
determine whether an online sample would support past research findings
concerning gender, age (including differences between college students and a
more diverse sample of older participants), and the link between religious and
paranormal beliefs.
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The following literature review begins with the definitions of the
paranormal construct in psychology. Theoretical conceptualizations regarding the
origins and bases of paranormal beliefs will also be examined such as the
cognitive deficit hypothesis (see Irwin, 1993) and the cognitive-experiential selftheory (see Epstein, 1990) including intuitive versus analytical reasoning
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Due to the goals and rationale for this research, a
large portion of the theoretical review will examine illusion of control research
conducted in the area and the misjudgment of randomness/prediction research.
The introduction will end by examining religious beliefs including theoretical
explanations for paranormal beliefs as a function of religion.
Definitions of the Paranormal Construct
Defining and conceptualizing paranormal beliefs is a complicated process.
Many researchers now agree that paranormal beliefs are representative of a
multidimensional construct including such factors as witchcraft, superstition,
traditional religious beliefs, and spiritualism (Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), although
researchers do not necessarily agree upon how many or which factors constitute
paranormal beliefs (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006).
Another complicating factor in the paranormal field of research is the
confusion of superstition, magical thinking, and paranormal beliefs into one or
more separate constructs. Tobacyk and Milford (1983) claimed that paranormal
beliefs should include superstitions, whereas Brugger and Graves (1997) argued
that paranormal beliefs are the same construct as magical thinking. Further,
there has not been a general agreement by researchers as to which beliefs are

4
superstitious and which are paranormal or related to magical thinking. It seems
that a reasonable conceptualization of superstitious versus paranormal beliefs
might relate to chance events versus behavioral events. Superstition can be
attributed to folklore usually dealing with luck such as throwing salt over one's
shoulder to ward off bad luck and evil spirits. Paranormal phenomena, on the
other hand, includes unlikely behaviors and actions (i.e. telepathy and
psychokinesis) that would bring about some result that defies science (Broad,
1949; Goode, 2000).
Definitions of paranormal beliefs have also varied. Literally, the Latin prefix
"para" means "outside o f or "beyond" (Goode, 2000). Technically, something
that is paranormal is anything that is not normal. In other words, paranormal
events are those that cannot be explained by scientific laws or natural forces
(Goode, 2000). Paranormal refers both to phenomena (events or abilities) and to
beliefs (that the events actually occurred) (Goode, 2000). According to the basic
limiting principle definition (the definition used by many parapsychological
researchers), paranormal beliefs, if true, would violate the basic limiting principles
of science (Broad, 1949; Tobacyk & Milford, 1984). This definition, however,
does not differentiate wholly between paranormal, superstitious, or magical
beliefs and does not account for other unfounded beliefs that could potentially fit
under such a broad conceptualization (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). A more narrow
definition of the paranormal suggests that such phenomena are scientifically
inconceivable processes or domains outside the realm of human capabilities
(Irwin, 1993). Lawrence (1995) further suggested that this definition include a
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dependence on psi phenomena as the core of paranormal belief. Therefore, the
definition used in this dissertation operationalizes paranormal beliefs as beliefs in
psi phenomena, which violate scientifically conceivable processes and lie outside
the realm of human capabilities (Irwin, 1993; Lawrence, 1995).
The following alleged abilities are commonly referred to as "psi" (mind-tomatter and mind-to-mind influence or communication) (Goode, 2000): telepathy
(mind-to-mind communication), clairvoyance (remote viewing without the aid of
technology), precognition (seeing the future), and psychokinesis (the ability to
move objects with one's mind) (Goode, 2000). If psychokinesis is excluded, then
these abilities are sometimes referred to as ESP (extrasensory perception). ESP
is the "apparent ability to receive information via a channel of communication not
presently recognized by mainstream science" (Wiseman & Watts, 2006, p. 324).
Belief in paranormal abilities may be manifested in several cognitive forms
including self-belief, other-belief, and general-belief. First, individuals may believe
that they have such abilities (i.e., "I am able to predict future events before they
occur"). Second, they may believe that others have these abilities (i.e., "Some
people have the ability to move objects with their minds"). Finally, they may
believe that such abilities exist in general (i.e., "I believe in the existence of
ESP").
Theoretical Explanations for Belief in the Paranormal
Researchers have postulated multiple theories to account for paranormal
beliefs. First, several researchers have speculated that societal influences result
in an emergence of paranormal beliefs (Irwin, 1993). For example, life
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experiences may be important predictors of paranormal beliefs especially if
family and authority figures hold positive views of paranormal phenomena
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Vyse, 1997). Media experiences may also play a role
in the structure of paranormal beliefs (Singer & Benassi, 1981). In fact,
individuals high in paranormal beliefs read more material and watch more
television with paranormal themes than nonbelievers (Auton, Pope, & Seeger,
2003).
Perhaps more important than societal influences and knowledge gained in
childhood from family is the role of psychological attributes in the formation and
maintenance of paranormal beliefs. Researchers have examined numerous
psychological functions related to paranormal belief endorsement including
cognitive-experiential theory and human information processing regarding
intuitive versus rational logic (Epstein, 1990; King, Burton, Hicks & Drigotas,
2007), and cognitive deficits including illusory judgments of control (Brugger et
al., 1990; Irwin, 1993; Presson & Benassi, 2003; Rudski, 2004) and prediction
(Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews & Blackmore,
1995; Sutherland, 1992).
Cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) is based on a dual-process
theory of cognition. CEST maintains that information can be processed from both
an experiential (i.e., emotional) and a rational mode (Epstein, 1990). The
experiential system is automatic, fast, and linked to the use of heuristics in
judgments (Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1998). On the other hand, the
rational system is effortful, logical, and analytical (Epstein, 1990; King et al.,
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2007). Individuals high in paranormal beliefs rely more on the intuitive emotional
system for processing rather than the analytical rational system (Lindeman &
Aarnio, 2006). Furthermore, high believers are those who have perceived
experiences of paranormal phenomena and reliance on the experiential/intuitive
system to process subsequent paranormal information has caused them to label
these events as valid (King et al., 2007). In a study where participants were
asked to watch several videos purporting to show ghosts or UFOs, the interaction
between intuition (experiential processing) and positive affect significantly
predicted whether seeing became believing (i.e., participants with more positive
affect were more likely to believe the videos actually showed paranormal or
magical phenomena) (King et al., 2007). Results from a study conducted by
Lindeman and Aarnio (2006) support the dual process theory of paranormal
beliefs; intuitive thinkers more strongly endorsed paranormal beliefs in their study
than did analytical thinkers.
Dual-processing theory is related to another line of theoretical research
regarding paranormal beliefs. High paranormal believers who rely more on the
emotional experiential system are more fixed on monitoring perceived threats in
the environment (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Paranormal beliefs might then serve
as a cognitive defense against such uncontrollable and potentially threatening
events (Irwin, 1993). The endorsement of paranormal belief serves as an illusion
of control (Irwin, 1993). Irwin (1993) described the relation between paranormal
beliefs and the need for control by stating that paranormal beliefs lend to make
more salient the occurrence of anomalous and uncontrollable events in the
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individual's life" (p. 28). A review of the relation between illusory judgment,
including illusion of control and illusion of prediction (as well as the cognitive
deficit hypothesis), and paranormal beliefs is discussed below.
Illusory Judgments: Control
One type of illusory judgment is the illusion of control. Control refers to the
attainment (actual or perceived) of a desired goal (Skinner, 1996). When
discussing control, it is important to differentiate between actual control
(objective) and perceived control (subjective). Actual control is defined as the
extent of control actually present as indicated by a, "normatively appropriate
assessment of the action-outcome relationship" (Skinner, 1985, p. 40). In the
study of control, however, it is generally the concept of perceived control that has
received the most attention. Perceived control is defined as, "the amount of
control perceived by the individual either in a specific situation or on the
aggregate (generalized) level" (Skinner, 1985, p. 40). It is clear from Skinner's
definition that perceived control can be either task-specific or generalized. In
addition to actual and perceived control, individuals also may have specific
feelings while interacting with the environment in order to produce or avoid some
outcome; these feelings are collectively referred to as experiences of control
(Skinner, 1996). Experiences of control can determine the subjective level of
perceived control (Skinner, 1996).
Past research has shown that an individual's perceived control is
associated with both mental and physical well-being (Bandura, 1989; Fiske &
Taylor, 1984; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Lefcourt, 1981; Seligman, 1975; Strickland,
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1989). Researchers have argued that people are motivated to seek and achieve
control (in the form of power, achievement, and self-efficacy) (Baumeister, 1998).
In the event that an individual feels threatened by a loss of control, he or she may
react in several ways including attempting to regain control or relinquishing
control (Skinner, 1996). Researchers have shown that whether or not individuals
will engage in efforts to regain control (i.e. cope with the situation) depends upon
the attribution or appraisal of the situation (Skinner, 1996). For example, an
individual who makes an initial appraisal of high control when threatened with a
loss of control may engage in activities such as information seeking to gain a
schematic understanding for an event (Fiske & Taylor, 2008) or the individual
may exert direct behavioral action to regain control (Fiske & Taylor, 2008;
Skinner, 1996). On the other hand, an individual who makes an appraisal of low
control will be more likely to experience feelings of helplessness and passivity
(Skinner, 1996).
Deprivation of control in an environment that is actually uncontrollable can
lead to an illusion of control (Langer, 1975). The illusion of control refers to an
individual's expectancy of success even when the probability of success is low
(Langer, 1975). Langer (1975) proposed a definition of the illusion of control as,
"an expectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the
objective probability would warrant" (p. 313).
Researchers have hypothesized that perceptions of control may be
threatened by stress and uncertainty. In an attempt to regain control, people may
resort to using magical thinking or superstitious strategies (Jahoda, 1970;
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Keinan, 1994; Keinan 2002; Singer & Benassi, 1981). This perceived control
could be labeled illusory control (Langer, 1975); actual control cannot be gained
using paranormal abilities if these abilities are not based in scientific reality
(Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). For example, Case, Fitness, Cairns, and Stevenson
(2004) varied the subjective probabilities of successfully choosing a correct target
card. When the probability of success was high, participants chose their own
card, which makes sense given their 88% probability of success. When the
probability of success was lower (1 out of 8), however, participants chose the
card selections of a psychic. The researchers claimed that this decision
represented illusory control1 because participants were trying to reclaim control
by relying on a strategy that was perceived as having higher levels of success
when their own probability of success was low (Case et al., 2004). Individuals
participating in games of chance in past research have exhibited greater levels of
paranormal beliefs if they demonstrated an illusion of control (Brugger, et al.,
1990; Rudski, 2004).
One way of studying perceived control is by examining participants' locus
of control differences. Briefly speaking, locus of control refers to an individual's
perception about the underlying causes of events in his or her life. A person with
an internal locus of control generally believes that his or her internal
characteristics (e.g., one's own effort, ability, or behavior) are responsible for
outcomes (Rotter, 1966). At the other end of the continuum, a person with an
external locus of control believes that external forces determine outcomes

1

Case and colleagues (2004) actually believed that their findings were related to participants' illusions of
secondary control.
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(Rotter, 1966). An individual's placement along the continuum is especially
important in terms of health, self-efficacy, and well-being. An external locus of
control is generally associated with negative coping skills such as attributing
outcomes to fate and negatively affecting well-being (Arraras, Wright, Jusue,
Tejedor, & Calvo, 2002; Lefcourt, 1982; Pearlin, 1999), whereas an internal locus
of control is associated with positive, more effective coping skills such as
information seeking and autonomous decision-making (Arraras, et al., 2002;
Crisson & Keefe, 1988; Lefcourt, 1991). An internal locus of control is also
generally associated with greater health and healthier behavior (Ai et al, 2005; AN
& Lindstrom, 2006; Ecklund & Backstrom, 2006; Langer, 1983; Rodin & Langer,
1977; Schulz, Thompkins, Wood, & Decker, 1987).
Contrary to the findings supporting the relation of illusion of control to
paranormal beliefs, an extensive amount of research has found that an external
locus of control is associated with greater paranormal beliefs (Allen & Lester,
1994; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Scheidt, 1973; Snel & Sijde,
1997; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, Nagot, & Miller, 1988). Some
researchers, however, have found no relation between an external locus of
control and paranormal beliefs (Haraldsson, 1981) or they have found that the
relation is dependent upon whether researchers are examining traditional
religious beliefs (Dag, 1999) or precognition and psi (Peltzer, 2002). One study
conducted with an older age group of participants (55-73) indicated no positive
correlation between paranormal beliefs and external control (Banziger, 1983).
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Conflicting findings in the literature regarding perceived control (including
locus of control) and paranormal beliefs may be explained when one examines
the experimental paradigms used to study control. In their meta-analytic review,
Presson and Benassi (1996) argued that many researchers who have discussed
their studies in terms of control measurement are sometimes actually measuring
other types of illusory judgments such as illusion of prediction. The researchers
argued that [.anger's (1975) classic study in which participants were given the
choice of keeping a lottery ticket or exchanging it for another was actually not a
direct study of control, but rather "she inferred personal control perceptions on
the part of her research participants" (Presson & Benassi, 1996, p. 497).
Using Presson and Benassi's (1996) argument, one might conclude that
Case and his colleagues (2004) were actually studying participants' illusory
predictions, their perceived ability to predict target cards or their belief that
another individual (the psychic) was able to predict target card choices. In fact,
the task they used is really a measure of belief in clairvoyance - an ability to gain
information through psychic means. In other words, clairvoyance is the ability to
see or predict current events, such as cards in a guessing task. Additionally, in
the study conducted by Brugger and colleagues (1990) participants did not
actually have control in the study. Instead, they were asked to predict the
probability of hypothetical dice rolls. The focus of this research, therefore, is on
illusory judgments under the framework of illusion of prediction. Paranormal
beliefs might arise from errors in human judgment (Singer & Benassi, 1981) and
the illusion of prediction may be one of these errors in judgment.
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Some researchers have argued that errors in human judgment related to
paranormal beliefs result from deficiencies in cognitive processes or skills (Irwin,
1993). The cognitive deficit hypothesis refers to the premise that cognitive
deficiencies are positively associated with paranormal belief (Irwin, 1993). Below,
I will review the research conducted in the area of cognitive deficiencies including
errors in prediction and errors in reasoning.
Illusory Judgments: Prediction and Reasoning Errors
High believers in the paranormal tend to make more reasoning errors than
nonbelievers (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger et
al., 1990; Dagnall et al., 2007; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Wierzbicki, 1985) and
are less able to think critically (Gray & Mill, 1990). According to the probability
misjudgment theory, paranormal beliefs may actually make participants more
likely to misjudge probabilities, which may lead believers to illusory predictions believing they can predict random events (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985;
Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992). In
another experiment, high believers in the paranormal were also more likely to
rate the probability of throwing one die 10 times and rolling all sixes as more
probable that throwing 10 dice one time and rolling all sixes (Brugger et al.,
1990). The results suggest that believers are less likely than nonbelievers to
either incorrectly judge probability rates or to accept that repetitive events
happen by chance (Brugger et al., 1990; Williams & Irwin, 1991). This latter
suggestion is supported by research findings that participants who give selfreports of belief in ESP are more likely to underestimate chance baseline than
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are nonbelievers in a random game of chance (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985).
Additionally, high believers were more likely to judge they were exerting control in
a psychokinesis experiment based upon chance scoring than did nonbelievers
(Benassi, Sweeney, & Drevno, 1979).
The probability misjudgment theory has been contested. When cognitive
abilities are controlled for in games of chance, often the relation between
paranormal beliefs and errors in probabilistic judgments disappears. These
results suggest that differences in cognitive ability can account for paranormal
beliefs (Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). On the basis of their findings, Musch and
Ehrenberg (2002) concluded that errors in probability judgments were not
associated with paranormal beliefs. In a newspaper survey assessing
participants' judgments of probability, Blackmore (1997) found that probability
misjudgments were not predictive of paranormal beliefs. Other research has
supported the finding that probability misjudgments are negated once education
and cognitive ability have been controlled (Bressan, 2002). Similarly, other
research has supported the finding that probability misjudgments are not
significant predictors of paranormal beliefs (Roberts & Seager, 1999). However,
this research did support the theory that paranormal believers are more likely to
show reasoning errors such as lessened ability for conditional reasoning
(Roberts & Seager, 1999).
Dagnall and colleagues (2007) argued that the probability misjudgment
hypothesis has only been studied in a partial way given the type of problems
used to assess such misjudgments. In their research, they used a variety of
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probabilistic reasoning tasks including the conjunction fallacy, perception of
randomness, derivation of expected values, and use of base rate information
(Dagnall et al., 2007). Based upon their results, they concluded that errors in
probabilistic reasoning are conducive to paranormal beliefs, but only those errors
related to misperception of randomness. Their results support the theory that
high paranormal believers are more likely to discount the role of chance than
nonbelievers (Brugger et al., 1990; Williams & Irwin, 1991). High paranormal
believers, therefore, are more likely to believe that they can predict chance
outcomes. In sum, research suggests that paranormal believers have faulty
cognitions, which include illusory judgments (i.e., underestimating chance
coincidences resulting in illusions of prediction).
Another theory in the parapsychological research is that cultural influences
may cause the endorsement of paranormal beliefs. Religion is one such powerful
cultural influence, which may be related to belief in the paranormal. In fact, it is
not uncommon for religions, such as Buddhism, to celebrate psi abilities such as
clairvoyance. The rest of this review will discuss the role of religion in the
endorsement of paranormal beliefs.
Religion's Relation to Paranormal Beliefs
Religion is a powerful predictor of a wide range of behavior and social
attitudes (Dillon, 2003). National surveys document that the majority of
Americans have a religious affiliation and believe in God (Newport, 2007).
Furthermore, spirituality is growing and is less constrained by traditional religion
than in the past (Roof, 2003). Religion refers to scriptures, social institutions,
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rituals, beliefs, practices, and so on, whereas spirituality refers more to an inner
sense of transcendence and self-transformation (Roof, 2003). Researchers must
consider spiritualism when studying aspects of religiosity.
There are similar parallels between religion and paranormalism including,
first, an emphasis on rejection of the material and acceptance of the spiritual and,
second, a belief in non-hypothetical truths (Goode, 2000). Certain characteristics
of Eastern religions are, in themselves, paranormal including faith-healing,
miracles, reincarnation, and visions (Goode, 2000). In fact, individuals who
believe in paranormal phenomena are also more likely to accept a spiritual
orientation to life (Goode, 2000). Findings from the Southern Focus Poll
conducted by the University of North Carolina (as reported by Rice, 2003)
indicated that 58.6% of respondents believed in psychic or spiritual healing, and
27.1% believed that they could use their own minds to heal their bodies. These
findings obviously contradict the popular belief that Christians will not hold classic
paranormal beliefs because church dogmas do not support such beliefs (Sparks,
2001).
Religious individuals and believers in the paranormal must believe in that
which cannot be scientifically proven and must rely on faith in certain beliefs.
Even in the face of irrefutable evidence, there is often a strong tendency to
believe. For example, Singer and Benassi (1986) found that, even after informing
participants that the "magic" they had witnessed was replicable and pretend,
participants still strongly maintained their beliefs that an actor's performance was
indicative of his psychic abilities. Interestingly, many students pointed to their
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religious beliefs as the explanation for their acceptance of the actor's psychic
ability (e.g., "...I am a Christian and I feel strongly that ESP or anything dealing
with that is of Satan") (Singer & Benassi, 1986, p. 62).
The results of research that has examined the association between
religious beliefs and paranormal beliefs has been mixed. Some researchers have
found that religious people more strongly endorse paranormal beliefs (Goode,
2000; Hergovich, Schott, & Arendasy, 2005; Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Deiin, 1995;
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), whereas some researchers have found that "nonreligious" people tend to endorse paranormal phenomena more strongly than
religious people (Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Bainbridge & Stark, 1980; Beck &
Miller, 2001). Other researchers have claimed that paranormal beliefs are a
substitute for traditional religious beliefs (Emmons & Sobal, 1981; Harrold & Eve,
1986; Wuthnow, 1978). Results obtained by Hergovich et a i , (2005) partially
support the substitution hypothesis; however, they claim that paranormal belief
can be, but is not necessarily, a substitute for traditional religion. The researchers
found that the relation between belief in the paranormal and religiosity was
significantly higher for participants without religious affiliation (although this does
not mean they were not spiritually inclined) than for Catholics and Protestants
(Hergovich et al., 2005).
Researchers have often associated New Age beliefs and belief in
witchcraft as "non-religious'' beliefs (Bainbridge & Stark, 1980; Goode, 2000). A
subscale of Tobycyk's (1988) Revised Paranormal Belief Scale is that of
witchcraft (i.e., "witches do exist"), which is a separate subscale from traditional
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religious beliefs (i.e., "there is a heaven and a hell"). This separation of religious
beliefs from witchcraft beliefs could be an unfortunate error on the part of
researchers studying religion's role in paranormal belief development. Wicca, a
Neo-Pagan religion, has an estimated two million followers (Taniquetil &
Arghuicha, 1999-2001). It is inaccurate for researchers to claim that witchcraft is
a separate belief system from religious beliefs; it depends on whether witchcraft
constitutes a religious worldview for the participant. An individual's endorsement
of phenomena that are typically considered paranormal (i.e., precognition,
telekinesis, clairvoyance) might predispose that individual toward choosing a
religion that is formatted with an emphasis on such paranormal abilities (or visa
versa and religion contributes to greater paranormal beliefs) (Willin, 2007).
Religion is a relevant variable in the examination of paranormal beliefs.
Religiosity has also been related to illusory judgments, in particular to
illusion of control. In a crisis, individuals may feel threatened by a loss of control.
Faith is one way of coping with this toss (Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger, & Gorsuch,
1996). Pargament and colleagues (1988) developed a theory of religious coping
and problem-solving. In their theory, they distinguished between three types of
religious problem-solving/coping: 1) the collaborative style in which the individual
ami God are m active partnership; 2) the self-directive style in which reliance is
on the self rather than on God in dealing with problems; and 3) the deferring style
in which the individual relinquishes all problems for God to resolve. These styles
of problem solving have been related to locus of control. The deferring style of
religious belief is associated with external control, whereas the collaborative style
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and self-directed style of religious belief are more associated with internal control
(Pargament et al., 1988). Some research, however, has contradicted the finding
that religiosity is related to personal perceived control; an inverse relation
between religiosity and perceived control was found in a sample of older
Americans (Shaw & Krause, 2001).
An explanation for the contradictory results between religiosity and
perceived control can be attributed to the complex nature between faith and
control. There are multiple pathways by which faith may be related to perceived
control (Ai et a l , 2005). First, religiosity may contribute to perceived control in
uncontrollable situations (Ai et al., 2005). Second, some individuals may
surrender to God, a religious worldview that discourages personal control (Ai et
al., 2005).
Understanding religion's role in the formation of beliefs about perceived
control is important from a health perspective. Marx referred to religion as "the
opiate of the masses" ([1852] 1983); however, religion can actually contribute to
a sense of personal efficacy and control over life outcomes. The passive
deferring style of belief has been associated with depression and anxiety (Exline,
Yali, & Lobel, 1999), whereas the collaborative and self-directive styles of belief
have been associated with better well-being, health, and increased self-worth
(Ellison, 1993; Krause, 1995). Religious attendance also fosters mental health by
enhancing self-esteem and personal efficacy (Ellison, 1993; Krause, 1995).
Through self-directed and collaborative styles of belief, individuals increase their
control and their mental health (Pargament et al., 1988). In a meta-analytic
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review, McCullough and Smith (2003) reported that individuals with high levels of
religiousness reported lower levels of depression. Religious attendance has also
been associated with lower "hazard of death" (McCullough & Smith, 2003, p.
194) from various causes including suicide (Hummer, Rogers, Nam, & Ellison,
1999; Martin, 1984; Strawbridge, Cohen, Shema, & Kaplan, 1997). These results
can also be partially attributed to the integrative capacities of religion in providing
individuals with social networks that give a sense of belonging to and satisfaction
with the community (Martinson, Wilkening, & Buttel, 1982).
Religious affiliation and religiosity have not been studied in terms of
illusory judgments other than control. This gap in the literature leads to questions
about religiosity's relation to illusory prediction. If religiosity is related to belief in
the paranormal, will high believers exhibit similar illusions in judgments? Further,
if religiously inclined individuals are more likely to more strongly endorse
paranormal beliefs, will they (in relation to paranormal believers) also be more
likely to rely on a paranormal strategy in a card-guessing task?
Proposed Integration and Rationale for Experiment
The evidence available from previous research supports the idea that high
believers in the paranormal exhibit more illusory judgments than skeptics. These
reasoning errors such as misperception of randomness (Dagnall et al., 2007)
lead high paranormal believers to discount the role of chance more than
nonbelievers (Brugger et al., 1990; Williams & Irwin, 1991). In other words,
believers in the paranormal are more likely than skeptics to find meaning in
coincidences (Zusne & Jones, 1982). Possible life events (e.g., using a psychic
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in the past) might lead high believers to faulty cognitions such that they believe
the psychic is able to predict future events due to psi abilities. The current
research will examine errors in reasoning, in particular illusory judgments of
prediction, in a card-guessing task.
Religion has been studied in relation to paranormal beliefs (Haraldsson,
1981; MacDonald, 1995; Thalbourne & Houtkooper, 2002; Tobacyk & Tobacyk,
1992) and many researchers have linked religious beliefs to beliefs in the
paranormal (Goode, 2000; Hergovich et al., 2005; Thalbourne, Dunbar, & Delin,
1995; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983). Aarnio and Lindeman (2007) found that religious
believers were more likely than skeptics to rely on error prone intuitive thinking;
however, cognitive reasoning in the form of illusory prediction has not been
studied in relation to religious beliefs. The current research will examine the role
of religious beliefs in illusory judgments of prediction and also determine if
religiosity is associated with external control.
The majority of researchers who have examined paranormal beliefs have
tended to rely upon data from undergraduate college samples. A potential
problem with using undergraduate students as the primary participants in these
past studies is that the involvement of the students may be lower than a sample
of adults who may be more actively involved in paranormal activities (McGarry &
Newberry, 1981). Messer and Griggs (1989) conducted a study in which they
asked students in an introductory psychology class about their belief in
paranormal phenomena and their actual personal involvement. In partial support
of the view that students are less involved, but have high paranormal beliefs,

they found that, although 56.8% of students stated some to strong belief in
ESP/psychokinesis, only 18.3% were personally involved in paranormal
activities.
McGarry and Newberry (1981) examined involvement in paranormal
beliefs in a sample consisting of psychic readers (the most involved), ESP
newsletter subscribers, psychic fair attendees, and students (least involved). The
researchers found that belief in paranormal phenomena was associated with
locus of control, but whether control was external or internal was mediated2 in
part by involvement in paranormal beliefs. A psychic reader, therefore, would
have a more internal locus of control than a college student, for example, who
may hold paranormal beliefs, but who has no involvement in such beliefs.
"Paranormal beliefs are associated with internality under conditions of behavioral
involvement, but externality when such involvement is lacking" (McGarry &
Newberry, 1981,p.734).
The conclusion that paranormal involvement plays an important role in
perceived control is supported by the research of Benassi and colleagues (1979).
They found that active/internal participants were more confident in their level of
control on more psychokinesis experimental trials than were active/external,
passive/internal, or passive/external participants. The conclusion from their
research is that active involvement in a task leads to higher levels of perceived
control if a person has an internal locus of control (Benassi et al., 1979).

2

McGarry and Newberry refer to paranormal beliefs as being mediated by involvement In accordance
with Baron and Kenny's (1986) distinctions between mediating and moderating variables, the term
moderating is probably more appropriate.

Paranormal beliefs may encourage involvement and involvement may reinforce
beliefs (Irwin, 1993).
Involvement in religion may also be an important variable. Frequency of
church attendance in the United States is a contested issue. General Social
Survey (2004) data indicate that approximately 28.3% of Americans attend
church weekly or more often and 21.9% attend church at least monthly.
However, some researchers have claimed that, when one actually takes into
account church attendance records, self-reported attendance rates inflate actual
attendance by approximately 50% (Chaves & Stephens, 2003). Keeping this in
mind, it does appear that frequency of church attendance and involvement in
religious activities is related to illusory control (Shrauger & Silverman, 1971).
Research conducted by Shrauger and Silverman (1971) indicated that
Protestants had a significantly more internal locus of control than Jewish
participants, whereas Catholics did not differ significantly from either group. The
Protestant participants reported greater religious participation and church
attendance than the Jewish participants. However, the Jewish and Protestant
participants did not differ significantly when only frequent attendees were
analyzed. Shrauger and Silverman (1971) theorized that involvement in religious
activities allowed participants to perceive that they controlled what happened to
them in their lives.
In terms of religious involvement with paranormal beliefs, Yamane and
Polzer (1994) found that participants who were religiously involved (i.e., church
attendance and prayer) were more likely to report paranormal experiences
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related to religion (such as ecstatic experiences). The researchers argued that
religiously involved (or absorbed) individuals would be more likely to report
ecstatic experiences. Additionally, religiously involved participants have been
found to be more likely to endorse paranormal beliefs related to telepathy
(MacDonald, 1995).
These research findings raise the concern that involvement needs to be
considered when researching religious and paranormal beliefs in relation to
illusory judgments. Participants in the current research will be asked to indicate
their involvement in both religion and the paranormal. For example, participants
will be given a checklist of psychic services and asked if they have used or
performed these services. Further, participants will be asked about their level of
involvement in their religion (e.g., church attendance). To expand upon past
research, involvement will be used as a predictor of strategy choice in a cardguessing task. This will be the only research, to date, to examine involvement
(both religious and paranormal) using an illusion of prediction framework.
One might question why it is important to study paranormal or religious
beliefs. Putting aside the pervasiveness of these beliefs, one might consider the
psychological advantages and disadvantages of endorsing non-scientific beliefs.
Many studies have found that beliefs in the paranormal are associated with poor
psychological adjustment, including irrational beliefs (Roig, Bridges, Renner, &
Jackson, 1998), high trait anxiety (Wolfradt, 1997), psychopathology and
dissociation (Dag, 1999; Gow, Lang & Chant, 2004), and low self-efficacy
(Tobacyk & Shrader, 1991). On the other hand, researchers in the field of
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religious beliefs have found that higher levels of religiosity are positively
associated with greater levels of happiness (Abdel-Khalek, 2006), self-esteem
(Keyes & Reitzes, 2007), optimism (Abdel-Khalek & Lester, 2007), physical
health and mental health (Abdel-Khalek & Lester, 2007). Religiosity has been
found to be negatively associated with alcohol use (Rostosky, Danner, & Riggle,
2007), depression (Keyes & Reitzes, 2007), pessimism and suicidal ideation
(Abdel-Khalek & Lester, 2007).
There are many questions that remain unanswered or require further
study in the paranormal and religious literature. First, are religiosity and belief in
the paranormal related, and if so, will believers in the paranormal differ from
believers in religion in a card-guessing task? Second, will religious and/or
paranormal involvement differentiate participants who choose a psychic strategy
from those who choose their own target selection? Will these results be related to
an illusion of prediction and will they support the theories that paranormal beliefs
are related to errors in reasoning such as mtsperception of randomness or
probability? Finally, will paranormal and religious beliefs be associated with
external control and can participants be differentiated based upon their level of
religious/paranormal involvement?
In Study 1, the experimental paradigm was assessed for believability and
validity. Participants were asked to choose a card themselves or rely on the
preexisting selections of a psychic. In Study 2, the addition of a third choice was
assessed. Would participants still use the psychic's selections if another choice
were available to them? Study 3 expanded on the findings of past research by
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integrating religious and paranormal beliefs into an examination of illusory
judgments under conditions of uncertainty. The goals of Study 3 included
examining the individual differences that affected strategy selection as well
replicating the findings from the first two studies.

CHAPTER I

STUDY 1
Study 1 was conducted to test the believability of the experimental
paradigm. It was hypothesized that when the subjective probability of success in
a card-guessing task was low, participants would rely on the selections of
another person. By relying on the prediction abilities of an outsider (e.g., a
psychic), the participant would be making an illusory judgment that another
individual was better able to predict chance events.
Method
Participants
Data were collected from 169 participants (61% female). Of these
participants, 49.5% were aged 18-24, 36.9% were aged 25-39, and 13.6% were
older than 40. Further, 77.7% were Caucasian and 63% had completed at least
some college work (only 15.5% had stopped their education after high school).
Materials
Participants completed an online experiment on the SurveyMonkey site.
Study 1 was conducted using a within subjects method. Participants were given
10 trials (5 high probability and 5 low probability) and were asked to pick the
correct card(s) out of 8 cards. They were informed that the probability of success
was either 7:8 (high probability) or 1:8 (low probability). Participants completed
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one of two ordered conditions. Condition 1 was ordered so that a high probability
trial came first; condition 2 was ordered so that a low probability trial came first.
The participants were told they could either pick a card themselves or have
somebody else choose a card for them. The "somebody else" was described as
individual who reported having psychic abilities such as ESP and precognition.
Procedure
Participants were recruited using several different methods. First, every
fifth group listed in each category of Yahoo Groups was selected, although
selection was also dependent upon group rules (no spam postings) and the
function of the group (only very specific topics allowed as postings). The
moderators of these groups were emailed and asked if they could forward the
link of the survey to their listserv. Second, the link was posted on the websites
socialpsychofogy.org and psych.hanover.edu. Each participant was given a
unique ID, which was not linked to any personal information, ensuring complete
anonymity of participants. Furthermore, the researcher opted not to collect IP
addresses, which could be used to track participants.
Participants were told they were participating in an experiment
researching the cognitive processes involved in online gambling. All participants
were told they would be entered into a drawing to win a $25 online gift certificate.
After completing the experiment, when participants hit the "done" button, they
were brought to a page that was separate from the experimental survey. This
page included the debriefing form and a drawing entry form. Participants who
wanted to enter the drawing were asked to fill in their personal information

including name and email address. Again, data and personal information
remained entirely separate.
Results
First, to determine whether there were order effects of high versus low
probability as the first card selection, a MANOVA was conducted with the total
psychic selection on the high probability and the low probability trials as the
dependent variables and order as the independent variable. Order did not effect
total psychic selection on the low probability trials (F (1,153) = 1.11, p = .30) or
on the high probability trials (F (1,153) = .000, p = .990).
To evaluate whether the probability of successfully choosing the correct
card influenced the choice to self-select a card or to rely on the preexisting
selections of the psychic, a paired-samples f-test was conducted. Participants
were tested under two conditions (five trials each): (1) high probability of success
and (2) low probability of success. The low probability trials and the high
probability trials were coded so that 1 - choosing the psychic and 0 = making
one's own choice. The mean for the low probability of success trials (M = 1.99,
psychic chosen on 39.58% of trials) was significantly different from the mean for
the high probability of success trials (M= .34, psychic chosen on 6.72% of trials):
t (154) - 9.53, p < .001. When the probability of success was low, participants
relied more on the preexisting selections of the psychic compared to when the
probability of success was high (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Strategy selection by subjective probability

To determine whether any of the demographic variables (age, gender,
education) as well as having used psychic services in the past predicted choice
of psychic or self, standard multiple regressions were conducted using the total
psychic selection for the high probability trials and the total psychic selection for
the low probability trials as dependent variables. The regression models did not
have significance, indicating that the only variable associated with strategy
choice was probability of success.
Discussion
These results supported previous research (see Case et al., 2004) that
participants will rely significantly more on the preexisting selections of the psychic
when their subjective probability of success was low. Under conditions of
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uncertainty, participants believed that the psychic was better able to predict
target card choices. However, these results do not indicate an illusion of control
(Case et al., 2004), but rather they indicate that participants believed that the
psychic was better able to predict hidden card choices when the probability of
success was low. These results are more aptly discussed using an illusion of
prediction framework (Presson & Benassi, 1996).
The results from this study support past research that participants who
endorse paranormal beliefs make more reasoning errors than nonbelievers
(Blackmore & Troscianki, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger et al., 1990;
Dagnall et al., 2007; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Wierzbicki, 1985). The results
were not related to any demographic variables such as age, education, gender,
or whether the participants had used a psychic before. The only variable that
predicted reliance on the psychic was the probability of successfully choosing the
target card.
Further exploration of the relation between subjective probabilities and the
illusion of prediction could be made by studying whether participants would rely
on a more rational choice rather than on the psychic when such an option is
made available. If, even given a third strategy choice, participants still rely on the
psychic more substance can be given to the illusion of prediction results of this
study. For this reason, Study 2 explores the choices made by participants in a
card-guessing task when they can choose the choices of a psychic or have the
computer make the selection for them.

32

CHAPTER II

STUDY 2

Study 2 was conducted to evaluate if the availability of a third choice (e.g.,
a computer's selection) would be used by participants rather than relying on the
psychic under conditions of uncertainty. In this study, participants were given the
choice of having the psychic choose a card for them or allowing the computer to
make a random selection. If belief in the paranormal was not related to strategy
selection, participants should be equally likely to choose the computer as the
psychic.
Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 71 participants (62% female). Of the participants,
39.4% were aged 18-24, 39.4% were aged 25-39, and 21.2% were older than 40.
Further, 78.9% were Caucasian and 77.5% had completed college.
Materials
As in Study 1, Study 2 used a within subjects design. Participants were
given 10 trials (5 high probability trials and 5 low probability trials) asking them to
pick the correct card(s) out of 8 cards. The probability of success was either 7:8
(high) or 1:8 (low). As in the first study, on each trial the participants were told
they could either pick a card themselves or have somebody else choose a card
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for them. The "somebody else" was an individual reported as having psychic
abilities. Study 2 differed from Study 1, however, in that participants were also
given a third choice (having the computer make a random card selection for
them).
Procedure
The procedure used in Study 1 was also used in Study 2. Participants
were told they were participating in an experiment researching the cognitive
processes involved in online gambling. All participants were told they would be
entered into a drawing to win a $25 online gift certificate. After completing the
experiment, when participants hit the "done" button, they were brought to a page
that was separate from the experimental survey. This page included the
debriefing form and a drawing entry form. Participants who wanted to enter the
drawing were asked to fill in their personal information including name and email
address. Again, data and personal information remained entirely separate.
Results
To determine whether the probability of successfully choosing the correct
card influenced the choice to self-select a card, to rely on the preexisting
selections of the psychic, or to allow the computer to make a random selection,
several paired-samples f-tests were conducted. Participants were tested under
two conditions (five trials each): (1) high probability of success and (2) low
probability of success. The low probability trials and the high probability trials
were coded to determine whether the mean number of times the participants
chose the psychic was significantly different from the mean number of times the
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participant chose the computer or the mean for self-selection based upon
subjective probability levels.
For the first planned contrast, the psychic was coded as 1 and the choices
of computer and self were coded as 0. When the subjective probability was high,
93% of participants always chose their own card; however, when the probability
of success was low, only 52.1% always chose their own card. The mean for the
low probability of success trials (M = 1.07, psychic chosen on 21.62% of trials)
was significantly different from the mean for the high probability of success trials
(M = .08, psychic chosen on 1.62% of trials): f (70) = -5.44, p < .001. Thus when
the probability of success was low, participants relied more on the preexisting
selections of the psychic compared to when the probability of success was high
(Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Strategy selection by subjective probability

The second planned contrast was conducted to assess if the mean
number of times the participant chose the psychic differed significantly from the
mean number of times the participants chose his or her own card. Psychic was
coded as 1, self was coded as - 1 , and the computer was coded as 0. When the
probability of success was high, 83.1% of participants always chose their own
card; however, when the probability of success was low, only 48% of participants
always chose their own card. The mean for the low probability of success trials
(M = -2.51 )3 was significantly different from the mean for the high probability of
success trials (M= -4.55): f (70) = -5.78, p < .001. Although participants were
more likely to choose their own card across the probabilities, they were more
likely to rely on the psychic selections when the subjective probability of success
was low compared to when it was high.
The third planned contrast was conducted to assess if the choice of
psychic differed significantly from the choice to allow the computer to make a
random selection. Psychic was coded as 1, computer was coded as - 1 , and self
was coded as 0. The mean for the low probability of success trials {M = .72) was
significantly different from the mean for the high probability of success trials (M =
-.20): t (70) = 3.66, p < .001. Participants were more likely to rely on the psychic
selections than to allow the computer to make a random selection when the
subjective probability of success was low compared to when it was high.
To assess whether any of the demographic variables (age, gender,
education) as well as having used psychic services in the past predicted choice
3

Note that means are negative because self was coded as - 1 . Negative numbers indicate that participants
chose their own card to a greater extent than relying on the psychic's selections.
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strategy, standard multiple regressions were conducted using the total psychic
selection for the high probability trials and the total psychic selection for the low
probability trials as dependent variables. The regression models did not have
significance, although in the low probability condition, age uniquely predicted a
significant proportion of variance in number of times the psychic was selected (p
= .047) and in the high probability condition, gender uniquely predicted a
significant proportion of variance in number of times the psychic was selected (p
= .050). Younger participants and women chose the psychic more often than
older participants and men.

Discussion
Even when given a third choice selection, participants were still inclined to
rely on the prediction abilities of the psychic rather than allow the computer to
make a random selection. Further, 7 1 % of participants chose their own cards in
the apparent belief that they were able to predict target cards.
Why do some participants rely on the selections of the psychic (i.e.,
other's prediction ability) rather than choosing a card themselves (i.e., self
prediction ability)? Do the paranormal beliefs of participants affect their strategy
selection? If the belief in the paranormal is related to errors in reasoning, will high
believers be more likely to misjudge probabilities or to misjudge randomness and
believe they (or others) can predict random events (Blackmore & Troscianko,
1985; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992)? Further, if paranormal
beliefs are linked to religious beliefs (Goode, 2000; Hergovich et al., 2005;
Thalbourne, Dunbar & Delin, 1995; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983), will highly religious

believers differ from participants with low levels of religiosity? Will religiosity be
related to errors in reasoning such as the illusion of prediction? Additionally, will
participants who are highly involved in their beliefs (i.e., believe they can predict
chance events or perform paranormal services) affect their strategy? The
purpose of Study 3 was to evaluate whether individual differences of participants
(i.e., religiosity or paranormal beliefs) would predict strategy choice in a cardguessing task.
Unlike the first two studies, Study 3 was conducted using a between
subjects design. In the first two studies, participants received five trials of each
probability in which the high trial came first and the low trial came second or vice
versa. This order enabled participants to compare probabilities from trial to trial
and may have resulted in some participant suspicion about the purpose of the
study. In Study 3, participants were not able to compare probabilities from trial to
trial. This will provide a replication using a different design if participants still
choose the psychic to a greater degree in the low probability condition.
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CHAPTER III

STUDY 3

The basic purpose of Study 3 was to evaluate whether the results from the
first two studies would replicate using a between-subjects design. The second
purpose was to investigate how individual differences (such as paranormal and
religious beliefs and involvement) as well as errors in reasoning predicted illusory
judgments of prediction. It was hypothesized that high believers in the
paranormal would rely on the psychic's selections to a greater degree under
conditions of uncertainty (i.e., low subjective probability) and to a greater degree
than low believers. On the other hand, it was hypothesized that individuals with
high personal paranormal involvement (i.e., performance of psychic services as
well as the belief in own psychic abilities) would choose the psychic less often
than individuals with low personal involvement. Further, it was hypothesized that
participants with only general paranormal involvement (i.e., having used a
psychic in the past, but not being personally involved) would choose the psychic
more often based upon past experience than participants with low general
involvement.
In terms of religious beliefs, it was hypothesized that religiosity would be
positively related to belief in the paranormal (see MacDonald, 1995; Yamane &
Polzer, 1994). Further, it was expected that participants who were higher in
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religious involvement (e.g., church attendance and religiosity) would rely less on
the selections of a psychic.
It was expected that women would endorse paranormal (Vyse, 1997) and
religious beliefs (Stark, 2002) to a greater extent than men. It was expected, that
younger participants (college students) would choose the psychic selection more
often than older participants based upon past research indicating that college
students are less involved in their paranormal beliefs and religious beliefs when
compared to an older sample (McGarry & Newberry, 1981).
It was also hypothesized that the probability misjudgment hypothesis
would not be related to paranormal beliefs (Blackmore, 1997; Bressan, 2002;
Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002; Roberts & Seager, 1999); however, it was expected
that overestimation of probability would be associated with choosing the psychic
more often (i.e., an illusion of prediction). Finally, based upon past research, it
was expected that participants with low paranormal or religious involvement
would exhibit an external locus of control (see Allen & Lester, 1994; GrothMarnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Scheidt, 1973; Snel & Sijde, 1997;
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Tobacyk, Nagot, & Miller, 1988); however, participants
high in paranormal or religious involvement were not expected to exhibit external
control (see Benassi et al., 1979; McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Shrauger &
Silverman, 1971).

Method
Participants
The sample consisted of 248 participants (62% female). Of these
participants, 64% were aged 18-24, 25% were aged 25-39, and 11% were older
than 40. Further, 29% were Catholic, 29% were Protestant/Methodist/Baptist,
and 32% had no religious affiliation or labeled themselves "spiritual".
Geographically, 64% were from the northeastern part of the United States. In
terms of education, 39.5% had completed college (only 7% had stopped their
education after high school). When participants were asked to rate their own
psychic abilities (from 1 = don't have any to 10 = excellent), only 51% said they
didn't have psychic abilities and 12.5% rated their psychic abilities above a 5 (M
= 2.29, SD = 1.85). Additionally, 55.3% of participants had used a psychic
service at least once (M = 1.58, SD = 1.83) and 31.9% had performed at least
one psychic service such as tarot card or palm reading (M = .65, SD = 1.26).
Materials
Study 3 used a between subjects design. Participants were given 10 trials
and asked to select the target object(s) out of 8 objects such as playing cards,
cases containing money, doors behind which were prizes and so on. The
probability of success was either 1:8 (Condition 1 - Low Probability) or 7:8
(Condition 2 -High Probability). On each trial, as in Study 1, the participants were
told they could either pick a card themselves or have somebody else choose a
card for them. The "somebody else" was an individual reported as having psychic
abilities.
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Participants were also asked to complete several questionnaires. The 20item Belief in the Paranormal Scale (Jones, Russell, & Nickel, 1977; modified by
Presson & Benassi) was administered to assess paranormal beliefs. The scale
includes 20 items on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to
5 = strongly agree. The range of possible scores is 20 -100. The scale taps
participants' beliefs about psychic phenomena in general, ESP, telepathy, and
precognition. Seven of the questions were designed to tap self-paranormal
abilities. For example, "I believe that I can project my thoughts to another
person." Reliability of the scale was high (a= .94). To assess paranormal
involvement, the self-paranormal ability subscale was used. In addition,
participants were asked if they had ever used psychic services as well as
whether they had ever performed psychic services (such as palm reading or tarot
reading).
To assess participants' control orientation, they were also given the
Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scale (Levenson, 1981). The scale
comprises 24 items on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from - 3 = strongly disagree
to +3= strongly agree. The scale is divided into 3 subscales comprised of 8 items
each (e.g., internality, powerful others, and chance). With the addition of a
constant of 24 to each subscale to eliminate negative scores, the range of
possible scores on each scale is 0 - 48. An example of an item from the
internality subscale is, "I can pretty much determine what happens in my life";
from the powerful others scale, "I feel like what happens in my life is mostly
determined by powerful people"; and from the chance scale, "To a great extent

my life is controlled by accidental happenings." Reliability of the internality scale
was low (a = .64). Reliabilities of the powerful others scale (a = .74) and chance
scale (a = .72) were moderate.
Religiosity was assessed using the 12-item Religiousness Scale
(Strayhorn, Weidman, & Larson, 1990). Most of the items use a 5-point Likert
scale, although some items use a 6-point scale with various selection choices
depending in the question being asked. For example, the question, "How
religious would you say you are?" is rated from 1 = Not all to 5 = Very much. The
question, "On the average, how often have you attended religious worship
services (i.e., Sunday morning, evening, and/or other days) during the last year?"
was rated using the choices: Never, a few times a year, only on Holidays, once
or twice a month, weekly or almost weekly, more than once a week. The scores
could range from 12 - 61. The reliability of the scale was high (a = .93). Religious
involvement was assessed using the worship attendance and the frequency of
prayer questions.
Additionally, to control for context effects, after completing the online
experiment portion of this study, participants completed several distraction tasks
including word jumbles and the Morally Debatable Behaviors Scale (Harding &
Phillips, 1986). Participants were also asked demographic information including
age, education, gender, psychic services used, psychic services performed, and
their own perceived psychic ability. Finally, participants were also asked to
indicate the actual probability that they would have been able to select the
correct target object.
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Procedure
The procedure used in Study 3 replicated that of Study 1 and Study 2. In
Study 3, however, students were also recruited from several psychology classes
on campus and were given extra credit by their professors for their participation.
Each participant was given a unique ID, which was not linked to any personal
information, ensuring complete anonymity of participants. Furthermore, the
researcher opted not to collect IP addresses, which could be used to track
participants. Data and participants information for the prize drawing also
remained separate.
Participants were told they were participating in an experiment
researching the cognitive processes involved in online gambling. All participants
were told they would be entered into a drawing to win a $25 online gift certificate.
After completing the experiment (approximately 10-15 minutes), participants
indicated their judgment of the probability they could choose a target object
successfully and then completed the Moral Behaviors Scale, several word
jumbles, and the Belief in the Paranormal Scale, Internality, Powerful Others, and
Chance scale, Religiousness Scale, and then answered several demographic
questions. When participants hit the "done" button, they were brought to a page
that was separate from the experimental survey. This page included the
debriefing form and a drawing entry form. Participants who wanted to enter the
drawing were asked to fill in their personal information including name and email
address. Again, data and personal information remained entirely separate.
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Results
To evaluate if participants varied in their selection of the psychic based
upon probability using a between-subjects design, an ANOVA was conducted
with condition as the independent variable and total number of psychic selections
as the dependent variable. There was a significant effect of condition (F (1,239)
= 29.86, p < .001). Participants in the low subjective probability condition were
more likely to choose the psychic (M = 3.07, SD = 3.43) than participants in the
high subjective probability condition (M = 1.07, SD = 1.76) (Figure 3).

Percentage
Mean
Across
Trials

• psychic

high

low

probability

probability

Figure 3: Strategy selection by subjective probability

To evaluate whether participant demographics, the scales, and
participants' judgments of probability (overestimation versus correct) were related
in the overall sample, bivariate correlations were conducted (Table 1). The
paranormal involvement items were broken down into two factor scores: the 7
self-belief items from the paranormal beliefs scale and the 8 items indicating
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performance of a psychic service were forced onto one factor score labeled
personal involvement (a = .84) and the 8 items indicating general use of a
psychic service in the past were forced onto one factor score labeled general
involvement (a = .62). Religious involvement was assessed using the total score
for frequency of worship attendance and frequency of prayer.
There were no correlations between gender and any of the paranormal or
religious variables. There was a negative correlation between age and religious
affiliation as well as between age and religiosity. Younger participants were less
likely than older participants to be religious. There was a positive correlation
between age and general paranormal involvement. Older participants were more
generally involved in their paranormal beliefs (i.e., having used a psychic). There
was a negative correlation between education and paranormal beliefs as well as
between education and personal paranormal involvement. Participants with less
education were more likely to endorse paranormal beliefs and be personally
involved in these beliefs (i.e., performing psychic services). Participants with less
education were also more likely to believe in powerful others and to believe in
chance. Not surprisingly, there was a negative correlation between education
and probability assessment. Participants who had less education were more
likely to overestimate the probability of choosing a target object successfully.
There was a negative correlation between religious involvement and
internality. Participants who were more religiously involved were less likely to
exhibit internal control. There was also a positive correlation between paranormal
beliefs and belief in chance as well as between personal involvement and belief

in chance. Participants who endorsed paranormal beliefs and participants who
were personally involved in those beliefs were more likely to believe in chance.
Finally, there was a positive correlation between paranormal beliefs and
probability judgment as well as between the paranormal involvement variables
and probability judgment. Participants who endorsed paranormal beliefs as well
as those who were personally or generally involved in their paranormal beliefs
were more likely to overestimate the probability of correctly guessing a target
object.
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A standard multiple regression was conducted to assess whether
paranormal beliefs and paranormal involvement would predict total psychic
selection (See Table 2). The total number of times the psychic was selected on
the ten trials was used as the predicted variable and the following variables were
used as predictor variables: general paranormal beliefs (i.e., the total of the
paranormal belief scale without the inclusion of the self-belief items was
converted into a z-score), personal involvement (i.e., performing psychic services
and belief in personal psychic ability), general involvement (i.e., using a psychic
service in the past), as well as the interaction terms for paranormal beliefs by
personal involvement, and paranormal beliefs by general involvement. The high
probability condition lacked variability (the psychic was only chosen 10% of the
trials); therefore, it was excluded from analyses.
The overall regression for the low probability condition was statistically
significant, R = .379, R2 = AAA, adjusted R2 = .105, F (5, 110) = 3.69, p = .004.
To assess the statistical significance of the contributions of individual predictors,
the f ratios for the individual regression slopes were examined. Three of the five
predictors were significantly predictive of total psychic selection; these included
paranormal beliefs, f(110) = 2.58, p = .011; personal involvement, f(110) = -2.22,
p = .029; and general involvement, f(110) = 2.60, p = .011. The nature of the
predictive relation of paranormal beliefs was as expected; the positive sign for
the slope indicated that participants with higher scores on the paranormal belief
scale chose the psychic more often than participants with lower scores. The
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Table 2: Results of Standard Multiple Regression to Predict Total Psychic Selection
From Paranormal Beliefs, Personal Involvement, and General Involvement.

TPS

GPB

PI

Gl

GPB

.178

PI

.055

.823

Gl

.271

.327

.335

Mean

3.26

-.180

-.112

.209

SD

3.57

1.09

1.02

.980

B

sr2unique

2.98*

.417

.05

-1.35*

-.382

.04

.905*

.248

.05

b

R2

= AAA

^ , = .105
R

= .379

Note: *p < .05, **p < .01, TPS = Total Psychic Selection, GPB = General Paranormal Beliefs, PI
= Personal Involvement, and Gl = General Involvement. TPS based upon selection out of 10
trials. GPB, PI, and Gl are standardized scores with mean of 0.

predictive relation of personal involvement was also as expected; the negative
sign for the slope indicated that participants who were more personally involved
in their paranormal beliefs (i.e., believing they had their own psychic abilities as
well as performing psychic services) relied on the psychic less often than
participants with lower scores. Finally, the nature of the predictive relation of

general paranormal involvement (i.e., using a psychic service in the past) was
also as expected; the positive sign for the slope indicated that participants
scoring higher on general involvement chose the psychic more often than
participants scoring lower. There were no significant interactions between
paranormal beliefs and paranormal involvement.
A standard multiple regression was conducted to assess whether religious
beliefs and religious involvement would predict total psychic selection (See Table
3). The total number of times the psychic was selected out of ten trials was used
as the predicted variable and the following variables were used as predictor
variables: religious beliefs (median split into high and low groups), religious
involvement (i.e., frequency of worship attendance and frequency of prayer
totaled and then median split into high and low), as well as the interaction term
for religious beliefs by religious involvement. The high probability condition
lacked variability (the psychic was only chosen 10% of the trials); therefore, it
was excluded from analyses.
The overall regression for the low probability condition was not statistically
significant, R = .206, R2 = .042, adjusted R2 = .016, F (3, 107) = 1.58, p = .198.
Religious involvement did, however, emerge as a significant predictor variable,
f(107) = -2.07, p = .041. The predictive nature of religious involvement to total
psychic selection was as expected; participants who were less religiously
involved chose the psychic more often than participants who were more
religiously involved.
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Table 3: Results of Standard Multiple Regression to Predict Total Psychic Selection
From Religious Beliefs and Religious Involvement.
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Involvement TPS based upon selection out of 10 trials, RB and Rl are standardized scores with a
mean of 0.

To assess whether participants' judgments of probability affected their
choice to rely on the psychic, an ANOVA was conducted using total number of
times the psychic was chosen as the independent variable and probability
judgment (-1 = underestimation, 0 = correct, and 1 = overestimation) as the
dependent variable. As predicted, there was a significant main effect for
probability judgment: F, (2, 233) = 4.63, p = .011, T|P2 = .038. Tukey post hoc

comparisons revealed that participants who overestimated the probability of
guessing the target's location successfully (M - 3.17, SD - 3.36) chose the
psychic significantly more often than participants who underestimated the
probability of success (M = 1.37, SD = 2.08). To evaluate whether controlling for
education would eliminate this effect, partial correlations between probability
judgment, total psychic selection, and education were computed. Controlling for
education did not eliminate the significant correlation between total psychic
selection and probability judgment (r= .183, p = .007).
Finally, a standard multiple regression was conducted to assess whether
participant demographics and the control subscales would predict total psychic
selection. The total number of times the psychic was chosen over ten trials was
used as the independent variables and the following variables were used as
predictor variables: Gender (0 = female, 1 = male), Age (0 = older than 25,1 =
18-24), Education (0 = high school, 1 = college or higher), Religious Affiliation (0
= none/other, 1 = traditional religion), and the Internality, Powerful Others, and
Chance subscales. The overall regression for the low probability condition was
statistically significant, R = .354, R2 = .126, R2^ = .072, F (7,114) = 4.42,
p <.001. To assess the contributions of individual predictors, the f ratios for the
individual regression slopes were examined. Only one of the seven predictors
significantly predicted of total psychic selection; this predictor was belief in
chance, f(114) = 2.18, p = .031, b = .158, p = .248, sr^nique = 04. The predictive
relation of belief in chance to psychic selection was as expected; participants
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who more strongly exhibited a belief in chance chose the psychic more often
than participants who less strongly exhibited a belief in chance.
Discussion
The first hypothesis that the results from the first two studies would be
replicated using a between-subject design in Study 3 was supported. Participants
in the low probability of success condition (i.e., under conditions of uncertainty)
were more likely to choose the psychic strategy than participants in the high
probability of success condition.
The hypothesis that participants with higher paranormal beliefs would
choose the psychic more often than those with lower beliefs was supported.
Further, the hypotheses related to paranormal involvement were both supported.
Participants with more personal paranormal involvement chose the psychic less
often than did participants with less involvement. These participants had
performed a psychic service in the past and were also more likely to believe that
they had their own psychic ability. It is not surprising that they would believe they
could predict the hidden object's location. On the other hand, participants with
more general paranormal involvement chose the psychic more often than those
with less general involvement. These participants has used a psychic service in
the past, so it is also not surprising that they would expect the psychic to be able
to predict the object's location given their past experiences.
The hypothesis that higher paranormal beliefs would be positively
associated with higher religious beliefs was not supported; there was no
association between any of the paranormal variables and any of the religious
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variables. Although the overall regression to predict total psychic selection from
the religious variables was not statistically significant, the hypothesis that higher
religious involvement would be associated with choosing the psychic less often
was supported. Participants who were less religiously involved chose the psychic
less often than participants who were more involved.
Contrary to past research and the study hypotheses, results from Study 3
indicated that men and women did not differ in their endorsement of paranormal
beliefs (Vyse, 1997) or religious beliefs (Stark, 2002). Women and men did not
differ significantly in terms of paranormal beliefs, religious beliefs, involvement, or
how often they chose the psychic strategy.
In partial support of the hypothesis that age would be significantly
associated with beliefs and involvement, younger participants were less likely to
be religious; however, age was not associated with religious involvement.
Younger participants were also more generally involved in their paranormal
beliefs than older participants; this result was not expected, but may be due to
the availability of psychic services at campus events and as campus
entertainment. Age was not associated with personal paranormal involvement.
These findings concerning age are important given that many past studies have
been conducted using samples of college students. This research supports past
research that younger individuals are less religious than older individuals;
however, it also supports past research that age is not positive correlated with
paranormal beliefs (G6ritz & Schumacher, 2000; Haraldsson, 1981). However,
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age was negatively correlated with general paranormal involvement, but in the
opposite direction of what was expected.
Contrary to the hypothesis that religious involvement would be related to
greater internal control, participants who were less religiously involved were more
likely to exhibit internal control. This finding may be explained by the argument
that religious involvement in the form of worship attendance and prayer are
methods that some individuals use to defer to God. Deferment to God
discourages personal control (Ai et al., 2005).
There was, however, a significant positive relation between general
paranormal beliefs and the belief in chance as well as personal paranormal
involvement and the belief in chance. These findings can be discussed in one of
two ways. First, this finding partially supports past research and the study
hypothesis that an external locus of control would be associated with greater
paranormal beliefs (Allen & Lester, 1994; Groth-Marnat & Pegden, 1998; Jahoda,
1970; Scheidt, 1973; Snel & Sijde, 1997; Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Tobacyk,
Nagot, & Miller, 1988). However, this explanation runs counter to the hypothesis
that individuals who are more personally involved in their paranormal beliefs and
believe that they have their own psychic abilities would exhibit internal control.
Another way to explain these findings requires taking a closer look at Levenson's
(1981) chance subscale. One could argue that the chance subscale is actually a
measurement of luck.
Luck and chance are two distinct concepts (Friedland, 1998; Wagenaar &
Keren, 1988). Chance can be thought of as a mechanism occurring in the
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environment; therefore, chance is an external factor (Friedland, 1988) or random
event (Wohl & Enzle, 2002). Luck, on the other hand, is seen as an internal
factor, which can be manipulated (Friedland, 1998) and may lead to an illusion of
control (Wagenaar & Keren, 1988). Luck-oriented persons see luck as a skill to
be mastered (Wohl & Enzle, 2002). If one views Levenson's (1981) scale as a
measure of luck than participants exhibit higher paranormal beliefs and personal
involvement actually would have been more likely to believe that the cardguessing task involved luck - an internal factor.
Finally, the hypothesis that overestimating the probability of choosing a
target's location successfully (i.e., an illusion of prediction) would be related
positively to psychic selection as well as to religious and paranormal beliefs was
supported. Participants who overestimated their probability of success chose the
psychic significantly more often than participants who underestimated their
probability of success. These results support the hypothesis that participants
would choose the psychic more often based upon an illusion of prediction; the
belief that the psychic was better able to predict target objects. Overestimation of
probability was also positively related to paranormal beliefs and both paranormal
involvement variables. Although participants with more education were less likely
to endorse paranormal beliefs and to be personally involved as well as more
likely to judge probability accurately, controlling for education did not eliminate
the significant positive relation between psychic selection and probability
judgments. These results are partially supportive of the probability misjudgment
theory (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews &
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Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992) that paranormal beliefs cause individuals to
misjudge probability; however, these results were not directly related to
paranormal beliefs but rather to choosing a psychic strategy under conditions of
uncertainty. Participants who misjudged probability were more likely to choose
the psychic if they overestimated probability and less likely to choose the psychic
if they underestimated probability. These results indicate that participants
exhibited an illusion of prediction related to the psychic's abilities.
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CHAPTER IV

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The present research aimed to expand the investigation of paranormal
and religious beliefs in relation to illusory judgments by assessing the illusion of
prediction in an experimental card-guessing task. Another purpose of this
research was to determine whether religious and paranormal beliefs were related
and to expand upon research by determining if religious beliefs could also be
related to illusory judgments. Another purpose of this dissertation was to
ascertain whether errors in reasoning such as probability over or underestimation
as well as perceived control would predict participants' selection of the psychic
strategy.
Study 1 explored the experimental paradigm and found that participants
were more likely to rely on a paranormal strategy under conditions of uncertainty.
Study 2 expanded upon Study 1 by determining whether the addition of a third
choice would eliminate paranormal strategy selection. Results indicated that
participants still relied more on the paranormal strategy under conditions of
uncertainty even when allowed a third choice strategy. The results of the first two
studies indicated that the paranormal strategy selection was pervasive under
conditions of uncertainty. Questions were raised about the individual differences
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of participants who consistently selected the psychic strategy as opposed to
choosing their own target object.
Study 3 was conducted using a between-subjects design to evaluate
whether the results from Study 1 and Study 2 (based upon within-subjects
designs) would replicate. Further, Study 3 examined demographics as well as the
ability to judge probability successfully and individual difference variables such as
paranormal beliefs and religious beliefs. The results from Study 3 replicated
those in Study 1 and Study 2. Participants were more likely to choose the
psychic's selection under the condition of uncertainty.
The finding that participants chose the psychic more often under
conditions of uncertainty was linked to inaccurate probability judgments and was
partially supportive of past research indicating that paranormal beliefs are
associated with misjudgment of probability (Blackmore & Troscianko, 1985;
Blagrove et al., 2006; Matthews & Blackmore, 1995; Sutherland, 1992). In this
research, however, it was not paranormal beliefs that were associated with
probability misjudgment, but rather selection of a paranormal strategy.
Participants who overestimated the probability of choosing the correct object
location chose the psychic more often than those who underestimated
probability. It all likelihood, it was not that probability misjudgments led to
choosing the psychic, but rather that choosing the psychic led to probability
misjudgments. Participants who chose the psychic numerous times
overestimated the probability that they chose the option that would be successful
(i.e., choosing the psychic). These findings were not eliminated after controlling

for education as would be predicted from past research (Bressan, 2002; Musch &
Ehrenberg, 2002), suggesting that participants exhibited an illusion of prediction;
they believed that the psychic was better able to predict hidden objects in a
condition with low probability of success.
It might be argued that participants were simply deflecting responsibility to
another individual (e.g., the psychic) when their probability of failure was high;
however, Case and colleagues (2004) addressed this issue by including two
other possible choices for selection strategy. In their study, participants were
given the choice of a psychic's, academic's, or student's preexisting selections.
Participants were still more likely to choose the psychic than the academic or
student, indicating that participants were not simply responding based upon
attributional biases (Case et al., 2004).
The results of this dissertation further emphasize the need to consider
paranormal involvement in studies of paranormal beliefs (Benassi et al., 1979;
Irwin, 1993; McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Messer and Griggs, 1989). Participants
with higher personal paranormal involvement and those with higher religious
involvement chose the psychic less often than participants with less paranormal
or religious involvement. General paranormal involvement, however, was
associated with choosing the psychic more often. Participants with higher
paranormal involvement were those who believed that they possessed psychic
ability; as such it would not make sense for them to choose the psychic's
selections. To some extent, it was surprising that personal paranormal
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involvement was not related to internality; however, an alternative explanation
regarding Levenson's (1981) chance subscale may account for this finding.
As argued in the discussion for Study 3, Levenson's (1981) chance
subscale may actually be a measurement of luck (for example, an item from this
scale is, "When I get what I want, it's usually because I am lucky"). Researchers
have found a significant positive association between belief in luck and belief in
chance (Darke & Freedman, 1997). If the chance subscale is evaluated as
actually representing chance, then this research supports past research that
external control is associated with paranormal beliefs (Allen & Lester, 1994;
Groth-Marnat & Pedgen, 1998; Jahoda, 1970; Scheldt, 1973; Tobacyk & Milford,
1983; Tobacyk et al., 1988). However, if the chance subscale is evaluated as
representing luck then paranormal beliefs and personal paranormal involvement
are associated with an internal, controllable, skill factor (Friedland, 1998;
Wagenaar & Keren, 1988; Wohl & Enzle, 2002).
Another important implication of this research relates to the findings
regarding age. Although age was not associated with paranormal beliefs, which
supports past research (Goritz & Schumacher, 2000; Haraldsson, 1981), it was
associated with religious beliefs and paranormal involvement. Younger
participants were less religious and less likely to be personally involved in their
paranormal beliefs; however, younger participants were more likely to be
generally involved in their paranormal beliefs. As previously discussed, younger
participants may have more opportunities to use psychic services on their college
campuses. Campus activity boards often book psychic entertainment such as

palm readers, fortunetellers, or mediums for small and large-scale events. The
results regarding age are important given that much of the data related to
paranormal beliefs has been drawn from undergraduate college samples. These
results support past research that involvement is an important variable and that
undergraduates differ from the general population in their levels of involvement
(McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Messer & Griggs, 1989).
This research is also theoretically important in its contribution to the
religious research literature. Participants who were more religiously involved
were actually less likely to exhibit internal control. This finding contrasts that of
Shrauger and Silverman (1971) who found that religious involvement was
associated with greater internal control; however, in their research, church
attendance was the only variable related to involvement and the effect was only
significant for women. Religious involvement in this study was measured using
worship attendance as well as frequency of prayer. Further, given that there
were no sex differences for the endorsement of paranormal beliefs or religious
beliefs, a sex difference related to involvement and control would not be
expected.
This research also contributes to the literature regarding religion and
illusory judgments. Participants who were more religiously involved were less
likely to choose the psychic than those who were less religiously involved. These
results indicate that religiously involved participants were less likely to make
illusory judgments of prediction regarding the psychic's ability.
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There were limitations related to the studies conducted in this dissertation.
First, the experimental design might have lacked mundane realism and,
therefore, might not generalize to situations outside of the experiment.
Furthermore, participants might have been able to easily determine the purpose
of the research (especially with the inclusion of a psychic as a strategy offered).
Suspicion about the psychic could have lead participants to choose their own
cards instead of relying on the psychic. Future research should include a control
manipulation that measures participant suspicion.
Additionally, this Internet research limited the available number of
questions that could be asked in order to avoid participant dropout. It would have
been useful to include two measures of control including Rotter's (1966) bidimensional scale of internal and external control in addition to a second
measure of paranormal beliefs such as the revised Paranormal Belief Scale
(PBS-R; Tobacyk, 1988). The PBS-R taps psi phenomena in addition to beliefs
about witchcraft and traditional religious beliefs. There are also sample issues
that must be taken into account with online research such as repeat responders
and non-serious responses. However, comparative analyses of traditional
methods versus Internet methods indicate that non-serious and/or repeat
responders do not affect data significantly (Gosling, Vazire, Srivastava, & John,
2004). Gosling and colleagues (2004) argued that Internet findings are
consistent with findings from traditional methods and pose no serious issues in
validity or reliability beyond those found in traditional studies; however, Internet
studies offer the additional advantage of a more diverse sample.
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Another limitation involves the question about the psychic services used.
The use of psychic services is not necessarily indicative of involvement in the
paranormal. Many college campuses offer entertainment to students in the form
of persons claiming to be psychics. It is not surprising that many participants had
used at least one psychic service. It may have been more telling to ask
participants how many services they had used in addition to how often they have
used these services. Future research may also want to inquire as to how often
participants watch television show related to the paranormal such as shows
where David Blaine or Criss Angel purport to be able to do extraordinary feats.
Future research should also examine paranormal strategy selection after
positive affect mood inducements to determine if strategy and paranormal beliefs
are related to the experiential system, especially given recent findings that
paranormal believers are just as able as skeptics to regulate their emotional
coping (Rogers, Qualter, Phelps, & Gardner, 2006). High paranormal believers
may be individuals who have perceived paranormal phenomena and relied on
the experiential/intuitive system to process these phenomena. This reliance on
the experiential system may have caused them to label these events as valid
(King et al., 2007); therefore, high believers might be even more likely to believe
that the psychic is able to predict chance events.
It might also be worthwhile to examine other experimental manipulations
related to this dissertation's experimental paradigm. For example, participants
might be asked to wager money on each trial. It would be interesting to examine
whether participants' strategy selections change in relation to gambling
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manipulations. This research could also be conducted using mood manipulations
to determine if more positive affect would be related to greater reliance on the
psychic strategy under conditions of uncertainty even when participants are
asked to wager money on low probability trials.
In conclusion, this research contributes a wider body of research related to
religious and paranormal beliefs. The findings support past research by
emphasizing the need to consider paranormal and religious involvement in
studies of paranormal and religious beliefs (Benassi et al., 1979; Irwin, 1993;
McGarry & Newberry, 1981; Messer & Griggs, 1989; Shrauger & Silverman,
1971). Further, this research adds to past literature regarding probability
judgments and errors in reasoning in relation to paranormal beliefs (Blackmore &
Troscianko, 1985; Blagrove et al., 2006; Brugger et al., 1990, Dagnall et al.,
2007; Gray & Mill, 1990; Roberts & Seager, 1999; Sutherland, 1992; Wierzbicki,
1985). In this research, participants who chose the psychic more often also
overestimated the probability that a target's location could be predicted
successfully.
This research is theoretically important because it closes some gaps in the
literature concerning religion and illusory judgment. Participants who were more
religiously involved were less likely to choose the psychic. Further, religious
involvement was negatively associated with perceived internal control.
Although past researchers have stated that they were measuring control,
some were actually measuring other illusory judgments (Presson & Benassi,
1996); this research is among the only research to connect paranormal and
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religious beliefs to illusory prediction. This research is also theoretically important
regarding the relation between involvement, beliefs, and illusory judgments. Past
research has not differentiated between personal and general involvement in
terms of paranormal beliefs. This research has shown that personal paranormal
involvement results in very different results compared to general paranormal
involvement. Participants who were more personally involved chose the psychic
less often, whereas participants who were more generally involved chose the
psychic more often.
In addition to theoretical implications, there are also implications for the
area of gambling as well as everyday paranormal experiences. Use of a
paranormal strategy (i.e., a "psychic" or, more likely, perceived personal psychic
abilities) may lead some individuals to gamble beyond their means, especially if
they believe that chance games are simply a matter of luck - a skill factor that
can be improved or manipulated (Friedland, 1998; Wagenaar & Keren, 1988;
Wohl & Enzle, 2002). Furthermore, during times of uncertainty (i.e., life seems
unpredictable or during times of negative life experiences), people may be
particularly vulnerable to individuals who claim to have psychic abilities such as
psychic hotline operators or fortunetellers. Use of psychic hotlines and call
numbers may not seem like an important facet of American life until one
considers that the psychic industry earns well over a billion dollars every year
(Nickel & Nisbett, 1998). Given the prevalence of religious and paranormal
beliefs and the billion dollar industries that have sprung up to take advantage of
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people's vulnerabilities based upon these beliefs, it is important that researchers
study the errors in decision making that result from non-scientific beliefs.
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APPENDICES

APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENTAL TASK/MEASURES
Directions given to participants for experiment
This is a card game. Your task will be to obtain the HIGHEST SCORE possible by
CORRECTLY answering questions about hidden objects.
For example, you will be presented with 8 hidden cards and asked to pick a RED card
from the 8. You will also be given some information about the 8 cards. For example, "1
of the 8 cards is a RED card."
You are COMPETING against other individuals so it is IMPORTANT TO DO AS
WELL AS YOU CAN.
When we have given this task to others in the past we have found that people find it
easier to occasionally follow the choices made by others.
In this experiment, we placed an ad for a person who claimed to have the ability to know
the correct card without seeing it. We tested this person's psychic abilities and found that
this person was, in fact, quite good.
The same questions that were asked of the psychic will now be asked of you. However,
unlike the psychic, you may choose to use the psychic's answer instead of selecting a card
yourself.
If you choose the psychic's answer and the psychic was right then you will also be
correct. If you choose the psychic's answer and the psychic was wrong then you will also
be wrong.
For each question, you will be given the same information as the psychic. You must then
choose between the psychic's answer or select from one of the objects presented on your
own.
REMEMBER, YOU MUST TRY TO DO AS WELL AS YOU CAN. THIS IS A
COMPETITION!
There are 10 questions to complete in this section. Check off the correct box to indicate
your answer. You must pick an object to move on to the next question.
PLEASE MAKE SURE YOU READ EACH OF THE QUESTIONS THOROUGHLY.
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S t u d v 3A: D i s s e r t a t
1 . 1 of the 8 cards is a CLUB. You must pick a CUUB from t h e S cards presented OR
choose t h e psychic's answer.

BSBKH

aSHHS

IEHMaW:K

CO) I choose trie psychic's selection
£ ) , Card 1
QjjCard 2

O cara 3
(~)i Card 4

£)|Card 5
( J j Card 6
(~)i card 7
(~^l Card S

4. Question 2
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.

1 . 1 of t h e 8 cases contains 1 million dollars. Please choose the correct case.

5. Question 3
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.

82

Study 3A: Diss-"'
1. Behind 1 of the 8 doors is a new LCD television. Choose the correct door.

6. Question 4
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.

1. 1 of the 8 cards is a Queen. Please choose a QUEEN.

f j j I choose the psychic's selection
f~>iCard 1
O

Card 2

QjCard 3

(3C8rd 4
QiCard 5
i Q Cord 6

0Card7
( ^ Card 8

7. Question 5
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.
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1.1 of the envelopes contains $1000. Please choose the correct envelope.

[~\l

choose the psychic's selection

(/^Envelope 1
C_\Envelope 2
C_l Envelope 3
f j h Envelope 4
f " j 5 Envelope 5
\ / \ Envelope 6
f J) Envelope 7
CjdEnvelope 8

Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.

1. 1 of the 8 cards is a diamond. Please choose a DIAMOND.

r j f j l choose the psychic's selection
QiCard l
Q i card 2

Q

card 3

QiCard 4
Q

Card 5

(~\, Card 6
QjCard 7
Q j Card 8

Please choose the correct target object o r rely onthepsychic's selection.
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1. Behind 1 of the 8 doors is a new sportscar. Please choose the correct door.

n
mil
Iiiliiil
f j j I choose the psychic's selection

QiOoor 1
g Door 2

O

k Door 3

( J i Door 4
C j ; Door 5
QjDOOTS
Q

Door 7

f j ] Door 8

10. Question 3
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.

1. 1 of the 8 suitcases contains $10,000. Please choose the correct suitcase.

J? f
[ l i

i* L ^ j L~.2 I— It L-. 1J •

5 t Jr

choose the psychic's selection

( 3 Case 1
C J j Case 2

C3case 3
Q j i case 4
rjjjCa'se 5
fjj.Case 6

o
o

case 7
Case 8

11. Question 9
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.
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niQ^pt-fpf i

1.1 of the 8 cards is a spade. Please choose a SPADE,

yjT"* WSmSt

12. Question 10
Please choose the correct target object or rely on the psychic's selection.

1 . 1 of the 8 envelopes contains the keys to a new house. Please choose the correct
envelope.

C^Jl 1 choose the psychic's selection
f~J| Envelope 1
Q j Envelope Z
f j l Envelope 3
r / i Envelope 4
r~)j Envelope 5
("^Envelope 6
r j h Envelope 7
f j j Envelope B

13. Probability

1
1. My probability of guessing a correct target object in any of the previous questions
was approximately:

Q;85%

Qi60%

Qso%

14. Questionnaire 1
You have completed the guessing portion of the study. Mow we have some additional questions for you to answer.
Please complete each of the questionnaires and assignments. TTiank you.
Please tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be
justified, or something In between.
1 . Claiming state benefits that you are not entitled to

I

R

2. Avoiding a fare on public transport

1

H

3. Cheating on taxes if you have the chance
4. Buying something you knew was stolen

CZZE3
5. Taking and driving away a car belonging to someone else (joyriding)

6. Smoking marijuana

7. Keeping money that you have found
8. Lying in your own interest

r—R

9. Married men or women having an affair

I

R
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2. What is your age?
i8 24

O O "-31
O

32-38

Q

39-45

O

16-52

Q

Older than 52

3. Where are you from?
C } Northeast
f _ ) Southeast
Q

Midwest

Q

West

Q

South

(~)

Outside of the United States

4. What is your education?
f O Some or Completed Highschool
f j

Some College

C~J Completed College
C~J Some Graduate Education
( _ ) Graduate degree (i.e., PhD, MA, MD, e t c . . )

5. What is your religion?
( 2 ) Catholic
( J Christian (Protestant, Methodist, Baptist, etc...)
C \ Evangelical Christian
( _ ) Jewish
( ~ ) Muslim
( ~ J Buddhist
Q

Hindu

( j

Wiccan/Pagan

Q

Other

Other (please specify)

gg

6. Have you ever used the following services? Please check ALL that apply.
I

I Tarot reading

|

| Palm reading

|

| Fortune reading

I

j Scrying (crystal ball)

|

I Handwriting analysis

|

| Dream analysis

|

| Medium services (communication with deceased)

I

I Ouija board

•
•

Other psychic service
Never used a psychic

7. Have you ever performed any of the following services? Please check ALL that
apply.
I

I Tarot reading

I

I Palm reading

I

I Fortune reading

j

[ Scrying (crystal ball)

I

I Handwriting analysis

1

I Dream analysis

|

I Medium services

|

| Ouija board

\ \
|

Other psychic service
| Never performed any of these

8. Please rate your own psychic abilities on a scale of 1 ( I don't have any) to 10 (X
am an excellent psychic).
9. I n the past year, how often have you engaged in gambling activities (i.e., playing
cards for money, playing at a casino, etc...)?
Q ; Never
(^J

Rarely ( 1 o r 2 times a year)

( " ) Occassionaily (3 or 4 times a year)
(

Y Moderately (every few months)

C_J Frequently ( 1 or more times a month)
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10. If you gamble, where do you do it? Please check all that apply.
|

| At my own or a friend's house/apartment

|

| At the casino

|

| At a club/underground establishment

|

I On the internet

|

| I don't gamble

11. What is the largest amount of money you have ever lost gambling?
\~j

I have never lost money

C~) Between $ t and $50
( _ ) Between $51 and $100
QJ) Between $101 and $500
Q

Between $501 and $1000

Q

More than $1000

12. What is the largest amount of money you have ever won_gambling?
C_J I have never won money
r ~ ) Between $1 and $50
Q

Between $51and $100

( " ) Between $101 and $500
( " j Between $501 and $1000
Q

More than $1000

13. Finally, where did you learn about this survey?
Thank you for completing this survey! Please hit the submit button to be taken to the debriefing/prize entry page.
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1. Paranormal Belief Scale (Jones, Russell, & Nickel, 1977; modified by Presson &
Benassi)
Please read each of the following statements and indicate, using the following rating
scale, the degree to which you agree or disagree with each one.
1Strongfy
Disagree

Disagree

Undecided

Agree

Strongly
Agree

1.

It is likely that many phenomena such as ESP (Extra Sensory Perception) will
one day be proven to exist.

2.

I believe that, at least on some occasions, I can read another person's mind
through ESP.

3.

ESP is a gift that many people have, and should not be confused with the
elaborate tricks used by entertainers.

*4. All of the reports of scientific proof for the existence of psychic phenomena are
sensationalism with no factual basis.
5.

With proper training anyone could learn to read other people's minds.

6.

Plants can sense the feelings of humans through a form of ESP.

7.

ESP has been scientifically proven to exist.

8.

I believe that psychic phenomena are real.

9.

Some people can make physical objects move or cause them to
change shape by their powers of concentration.

10.

Some people have the power to bend objects (e.g., spoons) with only their
thoughts.

11.

Some people have the ability to accurately predict the outcomes of dice throws.

12.

There may be some validity to psychic phenomena.

13.

With proper training, I could develop ESP.

14.

I believe that I have precognitive ability.

15.

I believe that I can project my thoughts to another person.

* 16. The results of dice throwing depend entirely on chance.
17.
18.

Some people can accurately visualize things before they happen.
If I concentrate enough I could learn to bend objects (e.g., spoons) using only
my thoughts.

* 19. Premonitions never have a psychic basis to them.
20.

If I wanted to see what the future has in store for me, I could use tarot cards or
an astrology chart.
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2. Internality, Powerful Others, and Chance Scales (Levenson, 1981)
-3 strongly disagree -2 disagree -1 slightly disagree +1 slightly agree +2 agree +3
strongly agree
1.
2.
3.
4.

Whether or not I get to be leader depends mostly on my ability
To a great extent my life is controlled by accidental happenings.
I feel like what happens in my life is mostly determined by powerful people.
Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on how good a driver I
am.
5. When I make plans, I am almost certain to make them work.
6. Often there is no chance of protecting my personal interests from bad luck
happenings.
7. When I get what I want, it's usually because I am lucky.
8. Although I mighty have good ability, I will not be given leadership responsibility
without appealing to those in positions of power.
9. How many friends I have depends on how nice a person I am.
10.1 have often found that what is going to happen will happen.
11. My life is chiefly controlled by powerful others.
12. Whether or not I get into a car accident is mostly a matter of luck.
13. People like myself have very little chance of protecting our personal interests
when they conflict with those of strong pressure groups.
14. It's not always wise for me to plan too far ahead because many things turn out to
be a matter of good or bad fortune.
15. Getting what I want requires pleasing those people above me.
16. Whether or not I get to be a leader depends on whether I am lucky enough to be in
the right place at the right time.
17. If important people were to decide they didn't like me, I probably wouldn't make
many friends.
18.1 can pretty much determine what will happen in my life.
19.1 am usually able to protect my personal interests.
20. Whether or not I get into a car accident depends mostly on the other driver.
21. When I get what I want, it's usually because I worked hard for it.
22. In order to have my plans work, I make sure that they fit in with the desires of
people who have power over me.
23. My life is determined by own actions.
24. It's chiefly a matter of fate whether or not I have a few friends or many friends.

3. The Religiousness Scale (Strayhorn, Weidman, & Larson, 1990).
In areas that refer to "God" please insert the higher power for your own religion.
1. How religious would you say you are? (Not at all, not very much, somewhat,
pretty much, very much)
2. How often do you study the Bible or other religious literature privately? (Never,
seldom, occasionally, frequently [at least once a week, but not daily], daily)
3. * Other than at mealtime, how often, on the average, do you pray to God
privately? (Several times per day, daily, occasionally, seldom, never)
4. *When you are tempted to something wrong, how often do you ask God for
strength to do right? (Very often, often, sometimes, seldom, never)
5. *When you have decisions to make, in your everyday life, how often do you ask
yourself what God would want you to do, or ask God for help in making the
decision? (Very often often, sometimes, seldom, never)
6. On the average, how often have you attended religious worship services (i.e.,
Sunday morning, evening, and/or other days) during the last year? (Never, a few
times a year, only on Holidays, once or twice a month, weekly or almost weekly,
more than once a week)
7. How much of your income do you donate per year to a church or religious
organization? (None, a very small donation relative to my income, a small
donation relative to my income, a medium donation relative to my income, a large
donation relative to my income)
8. How often do you serve a church or other religious organization in Sunday school
teaching, church project leadership, or other responsibilities? (Never, a few times
a year, once or twice a month, weekly or almost weekly, more than once a week)
9. How would you describe the nature of your relationship to God? (No relationship
or do not use the concept of God, distant relationship, between distant and close
relationship, close relationship, very close relationship)
10. How often do you experience or feel God's approval for some good act you have
done? (Never, seldom, occasionally, often, very often)
11. How often do you experience God's disapproval for some undesirable act you
have done? (Never, seldom, occasionally, often, very often)
12. To what extent are you conscious of some religious goal or purpose in life which
serves to give direction to your life? (Not at all, to a small extent, to a moderate
extent, to a large extent, to a very large extent)
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APPENDIX B: IRB APPROVAL LETTERS
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UNIVERSITY of NEW HAMPSHIRE
April 29, 2008

Erin Goforth
Psychology
Durham, NH 03824
Study: Illusions of Prediction in Relation to Control as well as Religious and Paranormal
Involvement
Approval Date: 11/8/2007
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at
http://www.hhs.qov/ohrp/humansubiects/quidance/belmont.htm or by request from the
OSR.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
For the IRB,

K^pCUV
impson'

Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research,
Service Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564
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UNIVERSITY of NEW HAMPSHIRE
April 29, 2008

Erin Goforth
Psychology
Durham, NH 03824
Study: Illusions of Prediction in Relation to Control as well as Religious and Paranormal
Involvement
Approval Date: 02/22/2008
The Psychology Departmental Review Committee, a subcommittee of the Institutional
Review Board (IRB) for the Protection of Human Subjects in Research, reviewed and
approved the protocol for your study as Exempt as described in Federal Regulations 45 CFR
46, Subsection 101 (b).
Approval is granted to conduct the project as described in your protocol. Changes in your
protocol must be submitted to this committee for review and approval prior to their
implementation.
The protection of human subjects in your study is an ongoing process for which you hold
primary responsibility. In receiving approval for your protocol, you agree to conduct the
project in accordance with the ethical principles and guidelines for the protection of human
subjects in research, as described in the Belmont Report. The full text of the Belmont
Report is available on the Office of Sponsored Research (OSR) webpage at
http://www.hhs.gov/ohrp/humansubtects/auidance/belmont.htm or by request from the
OSR.
There is no obligation for you to provide a report to this committee upon project completion
unless you experience any unusual or unanticipated results with regard to the participation
of human subjects. Please report such events to this office promptly as they occur.
If you have questions or concerns about your project or this approval, please feel free to
contact a member of the Psychology Departmental Review Committee.
For the IRB,

iuii<&t-_
wmpson
Manager
cc: File

Research Conduct and Compliance Services, Office of Sponsored Research,
Service Building, 51 College Road, Durham, NH 03824-3585 * Fax: 603-862-3564

